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We estimate measures of density and scale economies in the water industry in Brazil, 
Colombia, Moldova and Vietnam, four countries that differ substantially in economic 
development, piped water and sewerage coverage and characteristics of the utilities. We find 
evidence of economies of scale in Colombia, Moldova and Vietnam. In Brazil, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale. The results of this study show that the 
cost structure of the water and wastewater sector varies significantly between countries and 
within countries, and over time, which has implications for how to regulate the sector.  
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The provision of piped water and sanitation services is often cited as the typical textbook 
illustration of a natural monopoly.  This "natural monopoly" concept reflects technological 
and associated cost attributes that imply that a single firm can produce at a lower cost than 
multiple firms (Joskow, 2005). Such natural monopolies arise where the largest supplier in an 
industry, or the first supplier in a local area, has an overwhelming cost advantage. This tends 
to be the case in industries where capital costs are large and as a result create barriers to entry.  
The existence of a natural monopoly is one of the main reasons for regulating the sector. Yet, 
so far there have been few analyses of the cost structure of water utilities in particular in 
developing countries. 
 
Overall, studies of the performance of water utilities in developed countries provide 
contrasting findings regarding scale economies in this sector. Using data on 190 public and 31 
private urban water utilities from the United States, Bhattachryya et al. (1995) estimate 
returns to density at the mean (the short-run equivalent of returns to scale) at 1.25 for 
privately owned utilities and at 0.93 for publicly owned utilities; they find economies of scale 
for only private water utilities. Kim and Lee (1998), using data for 42 Korean municipal water 
supply companies for the period between 1989 and 1995, find evidence of diseconomies of 
scale in four cities, constant returns to scale in 12 cities, and economies of scale in 12 cities. 
Fabbri and Fraquelli (2000), using data on Italian water utilities, cannot reject constant returns 
to scale at the mean. Saal and Parker (2000), using data on water and sewerage companies 
from England and Wales, report diseconomies of scale at the mean (see also Hunt and Lynk, 
1995, for a study of the UK water industry). Garcia and Thomas (2001), using a panel of 
French local communities, cannot reject the hypothesis of constant returns to scale (for the 
delivery of water supply services). They even find evidence of diseconomies of scale for some 
utilities, in particular utilities which deliver a high volume of water per customer. Mizutani 
and Urakami (2001) also find evidence of slight diseconomies of scale at the mean for 
Japanese water utilities. 
 
As far as water utilities in developing and transition economies are concerned, the main focus 
has been on efficiency measures computed through the estimation of a stochastic cost frontier 
or using the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) technique (see Estache, Perelman and  
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Trujillo, 2005, for a survey). Estimates of cost functions and returns to scale are very scarce; 
we found only one study that calculated returns to scale from a DEA study.
2 The current paper 
contributes to fill this gap by deriving measures of density and scale economies from the 
estimation of a Translog cost function using panel data from IBNET on water and sewerage 




Because of high collinearity between the volume of water supplied and the volume of 
wastewater treated for utilities providing both water and sewerage services, we estimate a 
single product Translog cost function for all four countries. In this case economies of scale are 
a sufficient condition for natural monopoly (Joskow, 2005). We find evidence of economies 
of scale in Colombia, Moldova and Vietnam, implying the existence of natural monopoly. In 
Brazil, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale, which is inconclusive 
in terms of natural monopoly characteristics. We also find evidence of economies of customer 
density in Moldova and Vietnam: additional water users could be connected to the piped 
water network at decreasing average cost. We discuss the policy implications of these results 
in significant detail. 
 
This study provides new insights about the cost structure of water utilities in lower- and 
middle-income countries. Understanding the size of economies of scale in the water supply 
and sewerage industry helps to ensure that firms and policymakers can make informed 
decisions. If there are economies of scale and growing demand, firms may find it profitable to 
add more capacity than they expect to use in the immediate future. Furthermore, if there are 
economies of scale over the domain of market demand, large firms could produce at lower 
average costs than smaller ones; thus a competitive equilibrium would not be sustainable and 
a valid policy argument can be made for the establishment of a large firm (or monopoly) in 
order to gain the benefits of these economies (Kim, 1987). 
 
We define the concepts of cost function, economies of density and scale, and natural 
monopoly in section 2.  The specification of the cost function that is estimated for each of the 
                                                 
2 The one study we found was conducted by Seroa da Motta and Moreira (2006) who compute returns to scale 
from a DEA approach using data from Brazil. Findings from this study will be discussed later. 
3 The International Benchmarking Network (IBNET) is developed by the World Bank with the objective to 
improve the service delivery of water supply and sewerage utilities through the provision of international 
comparative benchmark performance information. For more information, see www.ib-net.org  
 
4
four countries is discussed in section 3.  In the next section, we present data and background 
information, while in section 5 we comment on the estimation results.  We conclude with a 
discussion on the policy implications of our results. 
 
2. Cost function, economies of density and scale, natural monopoly 
 
The analysis of the cost structure of water utilities will be based on the estimation of the 
associated cost function.  The water utility is assumed to make its input decisions in order to 
minimize the cost of producing some output level. The water utility’s total cost can be 
represented by 
( ) ,,, , CC y w z t f =            ( 1 )  
where y is the vector of outputs produced by the utility, w is the vector of input prices, z is a 
vector of control variables, t are time-specific shifts, and f are utility-specific shifts. The set of 
outputs to be selected depends on the activities of the utilities and on the availability of data. 
In what follows, we propose a general description of the cost function for a representative 
utility providing water supply and sewerage services. We consider two outputs: the total 




The major production factors for water and sewerage utilities are labor, energy, and capital. 
The underlying assumption is that the utility manager minimizes the cost with respect to all 
inputs, which implies that the level of all factors can be instantaneously adjusted. This is not a 
realistic assumption for capital stock though, which is generally considered a quasi-fixed 
input. For that reason, it is common to estimate a variable cost function or short-run cost 
function, in which capital is assumed to be fixed. The variable cost function includes prices of 
variable inputs and the stock of capital enters as a control variable (Caves, Christensen, and 
Swanson, 1981). We will follow this approach here and, from now on, C will stand for total 
variable cost incurred by the utility. In the subsequent empirical application, the variable 
inputs that are considered in the cost function are the costs of contracted out services (which 
gather costs of all services provided by third firms), energy cost, labor cost, and miscellaneous 
(or other) costs. The set of corresponding input prices will thus be  ( ) ,,, celo ww w w w = . 
Capital stock will be proxied by length of the water distribution network (len). 
                                                 
4 Generalization of the cost function to the k-output case (k>2) would be easy.  
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Because utilities may operate in different environments and the quality of the service that is 
provided to customers may vary across utilities, we need to include control variables in the 
cost function.
5 These control variables can include: dur, the average duration of water supply 
services (in hours per day); eff, efficiency as measured by the ratio of total volume sold over 
total volume produced; mco, the percentage of metered connections; ntow, the number of 
towns served by the water utility; pbr, the number of pipe breaks that occurred on the 
distribution network in a given year; pop, the total population served by the water utility; and 
vres, the proportion of the volume of water sold to residential customers.  
 
The estimation of a cost function as defined in (1) allows to compute various measures of 
economies of density and scale. 
 
Economies of production density 
We examine how the cost of the utility is changing if the total volume of water produced and 
the total volume of treated wastewater are increased, holding the number of customers (pop) 
and network length (len) constant. The elasticity of cost with respect to water produced and 











 (Panzar and Willig, 1977),  







If Rpd is greater than 1, economies of production density exist; if Rpd is equal to 1, then 
constant returns to production density exist; and when Rpd is smaller than 1, we have 
diseconomies of production density. 
 
Economies of customer density 
A second measure that can be derived is economies of customer density.  It measures how 
cost changes if total water produced, total volume of treated wastewater and the number of 
customers increase, under the assumption that the network length is constant. The effect of 











                                                 
5 See Mocan (1995) and Saal and Parker (2000) for a discussion of quality-adjusted cost functions.  
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 with Rcd the returns to customer density. 
The measurement of economies of customer density is important for developing countries 
where still large numbers of households do not have access to safe water supplies and 
sanitation services. If there is evidence for economies of customer density then new 
connections can be added at a decreasing average cost. 
 
Economies of scale 
We measure economies of scale by considering the change in cost following a change in 
volume of water produced and volume of wastewater treated, number of customers to be 





















, see Caves, Christensen, and Swanson (1981). 
Economies of scale exist when  1 RTS > ; if  1 RTS = , the industry exhibits constant returns to 
scale; and if  1 RTS < , diseconomies of scale occurs. In an industry experiencing economies of 
scale, the marginal cost of producing a service decreases as production increases. Similarly, 
1 RTS > ,  1 RTS = ,  1 RTS <  as the revenues from pricing services at marginal cost falls short 
of, equal or exceed the cost of production.
6  
 
Note that returns to scale can be seen as the long-run counterpart of returns to density, which 
measure the response of cost-minimizing output to a constant percentage change in all 
variable inputs, holding the variable input prices and the amount of the quasi-fixed factor 
constant (Caves et al., 1984). 
 
Natural monopoly 
We follow the technological definition of the natural monopoly proposed by Joskow (2005). 
In the single product case: “a firm producing a single homogeneous product is a natural 
                                                 
6 Consequently, a firm with economies of scale cannot recover its costs with marginal cost pricing.  
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monopoly when it is less costly to produce any level of output of this product within a single 
firm than with two or more firms”. This definition corresponds to the property of subadditivity 
of the cost function (Sharkey, 1982), which (in the single product case) is equivalent to 
economies of scale. Consequently, in the single product case, economies of scale are a 
sufficient but not necessary condition for natural monopoly (Joskow, 2005).  
The conditions for a natural monopoly in the multi-product case are quite complex and will 
not be detailed here since the empirical application is made in the single product context.
7 
Interested readers should refer to Sharkey (1982). 
 
It is important to keep in mind that natural monopoly characteristics according to the above 
technological definition (i.e. subadditivity of the cost function) does not by definition imply 
market or monopoly power. The latter has to do with the existence of close substitutes and the 
geographic area supplied by the firm. Hence, even if an industry has natural monopoly 
characteristics, it does not by definition implies that the industry has monopoly power. 
 
3. Specification of the cost function 
 
We choose the Translog functional form (see Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau, 1973) which 
has been widely used in cost studies. The Translog is a flexible form in the sense of providing 
a second-order approximation to any unknown cost function.  
 
The generalized Translog cost function for a representative water utility, including time- and 
utility-specific effects, has the following form:
8 
0
,, , , , , , ,
,,,
ln( ) ln ln ln
11 1
ln ln ln ln ln ln                     (2)
22 2
ln ln
tf t i i t j j t r r t
t i ws ww j c e l o r len dur eff mco
ntow pbr pop vres
ik it kt jm jt mt rs rt st
ik j m rs














∑∑ ln ln ln ln ,                                 it rt jr jt rt
ir jr
yz wz η + ∑∑ ∑∑
  
                                                 
7 This is also the reason why we do not discuss, in this section, the concept of economies of scope, which is 
relevant in the multi-product case only. Economies of scope exist if the same firm can produce several 
commodities at a lower cost than would firms specialized in each product. 
8 The utility index is not shown in order to avoid extra indices.  
 
8
where  ik ki β β = ,  jm mj λ λ = , and  rs sr γ γ = . Ct represents total variable costs in year t,  0 α  is 
the constant term, the  t α ’s are year-specific effects, and  f α  is the utility-specific effect. 
Theory requires that the cost function must be homogeneous of degree one in input prices, 
which is typically satisfied by dividing variable cost and input prices by the price of one input 
(we choose the price of labor). The homogeneity property implies the following restrictions 
on the parameters of the Translog cost function: 
1 j
j
λ = ∑ ,  0 jm mj
jm
λλ == ∑∑ ,  0 ij jr
jj
ρη = = ∑∑ .  
 
The theory of cost and production also requires that the own-price elasticities of the variable 
inputs be negative and that the Hessian matrix,  2
jm Cww ⎡ ⎤ ∂∂ ∂ ⎣ ⎦ , be negative semidefinite. We 
will check that these properties are satisfied on our data at the estimation stage. 
 
Given the large number of parameters to be estimated in (2), it is better to make use of the 
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for j = c,e,l,o, where xjt represents derived demand of input j in year t. 
 
Own-price elasticities, which measure the variation in input demand following a change of its 
price, are obtained as  ( ) 1 jj jj j j SS εγ =+ − , and cross-price elasticities are computed as 
jm jm j m SS ε γ =+ ,  ( ) j m ≠ . Morishima elasticities of substitution are defined as 
jm jm mm σ εε =−. Morishima elasticities measure the ease of substitution between factors j 
and m, and constitute a sufficient statistic for assessing the effects of changes in input price 




                                                 
9 Hicks (1932) was the first to introduce and discuss a dimensionless measure of substitutability of the input 
factors, the so-called elasticity of substitution, for a two-factor production. The Hicks elasticity of substitution is 
defined as the relative change in the proportion of the two input factors as a function of the relative change of the 
corresponding marginal rate of technical substitution. With more than two input factors, Blackorby and Russel 




4. Data and background information 
 
Data for the four selected countries (Brazil, Colombia, Moldova, and Vietnam) have been 
taken from the International Benchmarking Network (IBNET). These four countries differ in 
many respects, in particular regarding their level of economic and social development.  
 
Brazil has a diversified middle-income economy with wide variations in levels of economic 
development across the country. After decades of inflation, Brazil embarked on a successful 
economic stabilization program, the Real Plan in July 1994. Inflation, which had reached an 
annual level of nearly 5,000 percent at the end of 1993, fell sharply, reaching 8 percent in 
2004. In 2004, Gross National Income (GNI) was US$3,000 per capita (see table 1).
10 
 
After experiencing decades of steady growth (average GDP growth exceeded 4 percent in the 
1970-1998 period), Colombia entered into a recession in 1999, and the recovery from that 
recession was long and painful. Colombia’s economy suffers from weak domestic and foreign 
demand, austere government budgets, and serious internal armed conflicts. Inflation was 
moderate in the last few years (about 7 percent in 2004). In 2004, GNI reached US$2,020 per 
capita (table 1). 
 
Although the Moldovan economy experienced a constant economic growth after 2000 it still 
ranks low in terms of commonly-used living standards and human development indicators in 
comparison with other transition economies. Moldova remains the poorest country in Europe 
in terms of GDP per capita. In 2004, the registered GNI per capita was US$720 (table 1). An 
estimated 40 percent of population lives under the absolute poverty line.  
 
In 1986, the Sixth Party Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam formally began 
introducing market elements as part of a broad economic reform package. Vietnam achieved 
around 8 percent annual GDP growth from 1990 to 1997 and continued at around 7 percent 
from 2000 to 2002, making it the world’s second-fastest growing economy. Vietnam, 
however, is still a poor country with GNI of US$380 per capita in 2000, reaching US$540 per 
capita in 2004.  
                                                 
10 Gross National Income or GNI (formerly GNP), current dollars is the sum of value added by all resident 
producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of 
primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. Source: World Bank.  
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The Brazilian National Sector Information System (SNIS) which is a partner in the 
International Benchmarking Network (IBNET) provides annual information on 27 Brazilian 
regional water utilities for the period between 1996 and 2004. All surveyed water utilities but 
one provide water and sewerage services.
11 In Colombia, 228 utilities have been surveyed in 
2003 and 2004, but because of missing information for some variables of interest, only 48 
utilities can be used at the estimation stage. These 48 utilities provide both water and 
sewerage services.
12  In Moldova, performance data are available for 41 water and sewerage 
utilities for each year between 1996 and 2004. Moldovan water utilities provide water and 
sewerage services, except for two utilities which provide only water services and one utility 
which stopped providing water services after 2002.  For Vietnam, information on 67 
provincial water utilities offering only water supply services is available for the period 
covering the years from 1997 till 2000.
13 
 
Because the sub-sample of utilities providing only water services in Brazil and in Moldova is 
very small (1 out of 27, and 2 out of 41, respectively), we restrict the analysis to the 
respectively 26 utilities in Brazil and 39 utilities in Moldova which provide both water and 
sewerage services. In these two countries and in Colombia, the provision of both water and 
sewerage services should call for the estimation of a two-output cost function, i.e., the total 
volume of water produced and the total volume of wastewater collected and treated. However, 
for the three countries, the coefficient of the wastewater volume was not found significant in 
the cost function (which would mean that an increase in the amount of wastewater collected 
and treated does not significantly increase the variable cost of the utility). We believe that the 
non-significance of this parameter is driven by the high collinearity between the two output 
variables. High collinearity was also observed for control variables such as network length 
(water supply network length is highly collinear with sewerage network length), and 
population to be served (population supplied with water is almost perfectly collinear with 
population connected to the sewerage system). For that reason, and because estimates of 
                                                 
11 See Tupper and Resende (2004) and Seroa da Motta and Moreira (2006) for a description of the institutional 
and regulatory background of the Brazilian water and sewerage sector. 
12 Note that we cannot check if the final sample gathering 48 utilities is representative since information on the 
water utility size (volume of water produced and number of served customers) is missing for 129 utilities.  
13 The original dataset contains data up to 2003. However, because of inconsistency in the data from 2001 
onwards, we decided to consider only the 1997-2000 period in the econometric analysis.  
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density and scale economies were almost unchanged, we consider the total volume of water 
produced as the single output in the cost function, i.e., we have  { } ws yy = .
14,15 
 
The set of available input prices and control variables varies from one country to the other 
(see table A1 in Appendix). When available, we consider four inputs: costs of contracted out 
services, energy, labor, and miscellaneous costs (the latter is defined as the difference 
between total operational expenses and the sum of contracted out services costs, energy, and 
labor costs). The labor input is measured by the total number of staff working at the utility 
(reported in terms of Full Time Equivalent (FTE) staff numbers), and the unit labor price is 
obtained by dividing labor costs (including salaries, wages, pensions) by FTE staff numbers. 
For contracted out services, energy, and miscellaneous inputs, we build three price indices by 
dividing the corresponding total costs by total volume produced.
16  
 
The set of control variables includes: len, the length of the water distribution network; dur, the 
average duration of supply (in hours per day); eff, efficiency as measured by the ratio of total 
volume sold over total volume produced; mco, the percentage of metered connections; ntow, 
the number of towns served by the water utility; pbr, the number of pipe breaks that occurred 
on the distribution network; pop, the total population served by the water utility; and vres, the 
proportion of volume of water sold to residential customers. Unfortunately, information on 
water quality delivered by the water utilities is not available in any of the four countries. In 
each country, all monetary amounts have been converted into constant terms using the GDP 
deflator provided by the World Bank (see table 1). In all cases, the base year is the first year 
of the study period.
17 
 
We present some descriptive statistics of our data for each country in table 2. The average size 
of the utilities varies substantially across the four countries. In Moldova, the average water 
supply and sewerage (WSS) utility produces 4 million cubic meters per year, and distributes 
water to 30,000 persons through a 90km-network.
18 In Vietnam, the average water utility 
                                                 
14 As far as we know, Saal and Parker (2000) are the only authors to consider water supply and sewerage as two 
distinct products when estimating the cost function of water utilities, that they measure respectively with the 
residential population supplied with (drinking) water and the population connected to sewerage treatment works. 
15 The estimation of a single-product cost function rules out the possibility of measuring economies of scope. 
16 See also Garcia and Thomas (2001) for similar procedure. 
17 The base year is 1996 for Brazil and Moldova, 1997 for Vietnam, and 2003 for Colombia. 
18 From now on, utilities that provide both water supply and sewerage services will be called ‘WSS utilities’, 
while utilities providing only water services will be called ‘water utilities’.  
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produces 13 million cubic meters per year for a population of 142,000 through a network of 
166 kilometres. In Colombia, the average WSS utility produces 22 million cubic meters and 
serves 229,000 persons (network length is 322 km on average). Finally, regional WSS 
companies in Brazil produce on average 390 million cubic meters per year, serve 3,784,000 
persons through a network length of 10,715 km. 
 
Population coverage (i.e., the share of the total population of the area under utility’s 
responsibility which is supplied by the utility) is 49 percent in Vietnam, 63 percent in 
Moldova, 88 percent in Brazil, and reaches 95 percent in Colombia. The lowest density of 
customers is observed in Moldova (on average 275 customers per kilometre of network). 
Density of customers is slightly higher in Brazil (on average 376 customers per kilometre of 
network) and reaches 664 and 788 customers per kilometre of distribution network in 
Colombia and Vietnam, respectively. Energy costs represent about one-third of total 
operational expenses in Colombia, Moldova, and Vietnam, while it is much lower in Brazil 
(11 percent). Labor costs represent between 31 percent (in Vietnam) and 40 percent (in 
Brazil) of total operational expenses in the four countries. 
 
5. Estimation results 
 
Because the economic and regulatory environments in which utilities operate can be very 
different from one country to the other, we estimate the system combining the Translog cost 
function and the cost share equations separately for the four countries. 
For Brazil, Moldova, and Vietnam, we specify time-specific and utility-specific unobservable 
effects. Utility-specific effects, which capture all unobservable time-constant utility 
characteristics (e.g., efficiency of the utility manager), cannot be considered when estimating 
the model on the Colombian data because utilities have been surveyed only twice. We 
estimate the Translog cost function along with the input cost share equations using Zellner’s 
(1962) technique for estimation of a system of seemingly unrelated equations, under the 
assumption of fixed utility- and time-specific effects.
19 To overcome the problem of 
singularity of the covariance matrix, we delete one of the share equations. The regressors are 
all normalized by removing their sample mean. This mean-scaling transformation, which is 
                                                 
19 The system has been estimated using the (iterated) SUREG procedure from STATA software.   
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commonly performed when estimating Translog cost functions, amounts to choosing the 
mean as the reference point for local approximation. 
 
The set of control variables selected as extra explanatory factors in the cost function varies 
from one country to the other. In all cases, we keep the set of variables which yields the best 
fit to the data. Finally, the Translog cost function is estimated using data from 26 WSS 
utilities in Brazil (a total of 213 observations), 48 WSS utilities in Colombia (a total of 78 
observations), 38 WSS utilities in Moldova (a total of 237 observations), and 49 water utilities 
in Vietnam (a total of 145 observations). Estimated parameters of the four Translog cost 
functions (except for the utility-specific effects) are shown in Appendix (tables A2, A3, A4, 
and A5, for Brazil, Colombia, Moldova, and Vietnam, respectively).  
 
The goodness of fit of the Translog cost model is around 0.99 in the four models. The good fit 
of the model to the data is also reflected in the test of regulatory properties of the cost 
function. A well-behaved cost function should be: (i) monotonically increasing in input 
prices, (ii) monotonically increasing in output, and (iii) concave in input prices. In the case of 
a Translog cost function, conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied if the estimated factor shares,   
jt S  
(j=c,e,l,o), and the estimated elasticity of cost with respect to output are positive at all data 
points. A necessary and sufficient condition for a twice continuously differentiable cost 
function to be concave in input prices requires negative semi-definiteness of the matrix of 
second-order partial derivatives of the cost function with respect to input prices. We check 
that these properties are satisfied on our data. 
 
Cost elasticities 
Since variable cost and the regressors are in natural logarithms and have been normalized 
(mean-scaling), the first-order coefficients are all interpretable as cost elasticities evaluated at 
the sample mean (see table 3).
20  
 
The coefficients of the output variable and the input prices have the expected signs and are 
highly significant in the four countries. As one would expect, there is a strong positive 
relationship between total variable cost and output when all other factors are fixed. A one 
percent increase in volume of water produced leads to an increase in total variable cost which 
                                                 
20 By sample mean, we mean the service with the average characteristics in each country.  
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varies from 0.61 percent in Vietnam to 0.96 percent in Moldova. The lowest cost elasticity is 
estimated for Vietnam which is the only country where utilities only provide water services.
21 
 
The elasticities of cost with respect to the factor prices are equivalent to shares in total cost. 
Thus, at the sample mean, energy accounts for approximately 32 percent of utility variable 
costs in Colombia and Vietnam, 38 percent in Moldova, but only 11 percent in Brazil. The 
control variables are, overall, less significant in the four models. We find that length of 
distribution network has a significant impact on variable costs in Brazil and in Vietnam 
(elasticity is small, estimated at around 0.1 and 0.06, respectively). A larger population served 
by the water utility is found to increase variable costs in Brazil, Colombia, and Vietnam. A 
one percent increase in the number of supplied customers results in an increase in variable 
costs by 0.1 percent, 0.2 percent, and 0.3 percent, respectively. Maybe surprisingly, the 
variable measuring duration of water supply (average number of hours per day) has a negative 
and significant effect on total variable cost in Vietnam (cost elasticity is estimated at –0.18). 
In Colombia, variable costs are found to decrease when the proportion of total volume sold to 
residential consumers increase, possibly suggesting that non-residential consumers tend to be 
more expensive to serve.  The lower non-revenue water (as measured by a lower ratio of 
water sold versus water produced), the lower the total variable cost.  Reducing non-revenue 
water has a positive impact on the total variable costs, but is only significant at the 10 percent 
level, and not significant in the case of Brazil.  Finally, we do not find any significant impact 
of the number of pipe breaks and of the share of metered connections on the total variable 
cost, at the sample mean. 
 
Own-price elasticities and Morishima elasticities of substitution 
Own-price elasticities and Morishima elasticities of substitution are shown in table 4. In all 
cases, standard errors have been computed using Kmenta (1986)’s method. All own-price 
elasticities are negative and significant, indicating that the demand of any input decreases 
when its price increases. The four inputs are found quite inelastic to their own prices in the 
four countries. The elasticity of energy demand to its own price varies from -0.13 in Colombia 
to –0.26 in Vietnam (i.e., a 1 percent increase in energy price decreases the demand for 
energy inputs by 0.13 percent and 0.26 percent respectively). For labor, elasticity varies from 
                                                 
21 This comment refers to the concept of economies of scope that we cannot measure here since collinearity in 
the data did not permit the estimation of a two-product cost function.  
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–0.10 in Brazil to –0.30 in Vietnam. Morishima elasticities of substitution are all found 
positive, indicating that the four inputs are substitutes, in the four countries. 
 
Returns to density and returns to scale 
We present estimates of returns to production density (Rpd), returns to customer density (Rcd), 
and returns to scale (RTS), computed at the sample mean, in table 5. In all cases, we report the 
estimated standard error and we test the null hypothesis that the estimated return is constant 
(H0: estimated return = 1); again the alternative is that the estimated return is increasing or 
decreasing (H1: estimated return < 1 or estimated return > 1). We find significant increasing 
returns to density in the four countries. Note that, because we consider a single-output cost 



















In all four countries, an increase in the total volume of water produced, while holding the 
length of the network and the number of customers constant (i.e., an increase in water 
consumption per customer), would decrease average variable costs. Estimated returns to 
production density varies from 1.39 in Brazil to 1.69 in Colombia, thus showing that the water 
industry, in the four countries, exhibit significant economies of production density. 
 
We find significant economies of customer density in Moldova and Vietnam but we cannot 
reject the hypothesis of constant returns to customer density in Brazil and Colombia. In other 
words, an increase in the total volume of water produced along with an increase in the number 
of supplied customers (while holding the network length constant) is found to decrease 
average variable costs only in Moldova and Vietnam. Constant returns to customer density in 
Brazil and Colombia may be explained by the relatively high access to piped water in these 
countries (86 percent and 95 percent, respectively, see table 2).  
 
Returns to scale, which can be seen as the long-run counterpart of returns to production 
density, are found to be increasing in Colombia (estimated at 1.11), Moldova (1.26) and 
Vietnam (1.16). In Brazil, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that returns to scale are 
constant, at the sample mean. Put differently, the water and sewerage industry is found to be 




22 Estimated returns at the sample mean for the four countries lie in 
the range of returns to scale estimated in developed countries (see Mizutani and Urakami, 
2001, for a review). For the case of Brazil, our results in terms of returns to scale differ from 
the ones derived by Seroa da Motta and Moreira (2006) using DEA techniques. Using data on 
107 operators (both regional and local) over the 1998-2002 period, they find returns to scale 
for the regional companies of about 2.5. The discrepancy between the two sets of results may 
be explained by the different sample sizes (our sample contains 26 regional operators and 
cover the period between 1996 and 2004) but also by the use of different techniques 
(regression analysis versus DEA). Cubbin and Tzanidakis (1998) compare regression and 
Data Envelopment Analysis techniques, and note that these techniques do not always end up 
with similar results especially when small sample sizes are used. 
 
Because estimated returns at the sample mean (i.e., for the utilities’ services with average 
characteristics) may be misleading, we report estimated returns for different groups of 
utilities. We report estimated returns to production density, estimated returns to customer 
density, and estimated returns to scale, for utilities classified in either small, medium, or large 
sized utilities, with respect to: (a) total volume of water produced by the utility, (b) number of 
water connections served by the utility, (c) volume of water produced per residential 
customer, and (d) number of customers per kilometre of water supply network.
23 Estimated 
returns for Brazil, Colombia, Moldova, and Vietnam are shown in tables 6, 7, 8, and 9 
respectively. 
 
We find similar trends in the four countries. In particular, we observe that estimated returns to 
scale decrease with utility size, as measured by total volume of water produced or number of 
connections served. Also, in most cases, the larger the volume of water or wastewater 
produced per residential customer, the lower the returns to scale.  In Brazil, we cannot reject 
the null of constant returns to scale in all cases, with estimated returns lower than 1 in most 
cases (even if not statistically different from 1). In Colombia, we find significant economies 
of scale for all groups of WSS utilities. In Moldova, we find evidence of economies of scale 
                                                 
22 The result that the WSS industry in Brazil exhibit constant returns to scale does not rule out the possibility that 
this industry has natural monopoly characteristics. Indeed, economies of scale are a sufficient but not a necessary 
condition for a natural monopoly (Joskow, 2005). 
23 Water utilities serve also industrial and/or institutional customers so the volume produced per residential 
customer may vary significantly from one water utility to the other. We consider the ratio of total volume 
produced per residential customer instead of total volume of water sold to residential users per customer because 
the latter was not available in the four countries.  
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for small WSS utilities, but we cannot reject the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale 
for the large WSS utilities. The same kind of results is obtained for Vietnam: we find 
significant economies of scale for smaller water utilities.  
 
In table 10, we report estimated returns to scale at the sample mean of each year. Estimated 
returns are found almost constant over the period in Brazil. The test of constant returns to 
scale cannot be rejected in all years. In Colombia, WSS utilities exhibit increasing returns to 
scale in 2003 and 2004. We find significant economies of scale in Moldova between 1996 and 
2004, with returns to scale increasing over time, coinciding with a period in which the 
quantity and quality of water and sewerage services is steadily declining. In Vietnam, we also 
find significant economies of scale, but slightly lower at the end of the period than at the 
beginning. 
 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
Using data from the IBNET database, we estimate measures of density and scale economies in 
four countries (Brazil, Colombia, Moldova and Vietnam) that differ substantially in economic 
development, piped water and sewerage coverage and characteristics of the utilities operating 
in the different countries.  The analysis leads us to the following findings.  
 
First, we find evidence of economies of scale in three of the four countries: Colombia, 
Moldova, and Vietnam. For the regional WSS utilities operating in Brazil, we cannot reject 
the hypothesis of constant returns to scale. The largest returns to scale at the mean (i.e., for the 
service with the average characteristics) are obtained for Moldova (1.26). WSS utilities 
operating in this country are on average small (compared to the size of utilities in the three 
other countries), with an average served population of 30,000 persons. The second largest 
returns to scale are estimated for Vietnamese water utilities (1.16), which serve on average a 
population of 142,000, followed by Colombian WSS utilities (1.11) which serve 229,000 
inhabitants. In Brazil, we find evidence of constant returns to scale for the full set of regional 
WSS companies that serve on average a population of about 4 million.  
 
The evidence seems to suggest that the very large size of the Brazilian regional WSS utilities 
may result in X inefficiencies.  As utilities become larger, the increase in the administrative  
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costs to run these large utilities may outweigh the gains in the unit costs of service provision. 
Feigenbaum and Teeples (1983) notice that lack of economies of scale can be due to the fact 
that such utilities may offer a broader range of services which would raise unit costs.  In the 
case of Brazil, the regional utilities offer both water and sewerage collection and increasingly 
sewerage treatment services.  To see in how far this hypothesis can be tested, we estimated 
returns to scale for smaller (municipal) companies in Brazil. IBNET contains data on 426 
Brazilian municipal WSS utilities over the period between 2000 and 2004. The average 
municipal WSS utility in Brazil serves a population of 174,000 persons (which is in between 
the size of the average Vietnamese and Colombian utilities, see table 2). We estimate returns 
to production density, returns to customer density, and returns to scale, at the mean, on the 
sample of regional WSS utilities and on the sample of municipal WSS utilities, over the 2000-
2004 period. Yet, for both municipal and regional WSS companies, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis of constant returns to scale (see table A6 in Appendix).  
 
Secondly, few utilities in developed countries are characterized by economies of scale.   
Brazil, which is the richest country in the sample of four case studies, does not exhibit 
economies of scale for both municipal and regional WSS companies, as the hypothesis of 
constant returns to scale can not be rejected.  From the latter results, it seems that, not only the 
size of the utilities but also the country’s level of economic development, may explain that 
water and sewerage services do not necessarily operate under increasing returns to scale, 
similar to what was found in more developed countries (see the literature review in the 
introduction). Utilities in more developed countries may provide more water supply and 
wastewater collection and treatment services, services of better quality (universal coverage, 
24-hour supply, quality of drinking water) and tend to operate in more regulated environments 
(possibly due to increased regulation of an environmental and economic nature, including 
labor regulation).
24  The provision of a greater number of higher quality water supply and 
sewerage services may increase administrative costs.  High coverage levels that typically 
increase with development status will require the utilities to expand their network to more 
remote areas which may be reflected in lower network density of consumers, which is much 
lower in Brazil than in Colombia or Vietnam.  The number of case studies in this study is 
limited to four, and hence a future area of research could be an analysis to investigate the 
                                                 
24 In Moldova (where we estimate the highest returns to scale), the quality of the water service is known to be 
quite deficient, in terms of population coverage and average duration of supply in particular (Moldova Apă-
Canal Association, 2004). Unfortunately, information on average duration of supply and number of pipe breaks 
are not available for Brazilian water utilities.  
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relationship between level of economic development and economies of scale, and under what 
conditions economies of scale turn into diseconomies of scale.   
 
Thirdly, economies of customer density are measured by how costs change if total water 
produced and the number of customers increases, under the assumption that the network 
length is constant. The effect of adding new customers shows diseconomies of consumer 
density in Brazil and Colombia, and economies of consumer density in Moldova and Vietnam 
– suggesting that there might be a turning point where positive network effects seem to 
disappear.  Both Brazil and Colombia have achieved high coverage rates. The remaining 
households may be more difficult to serve with water and sanitation services (for instance, 
because they live in the periphery of the network system), resulting in higher costs to serve 
each additional customer. 
 
Fourthly, the presence of economies of scale in the delivery of water supply and sewerage 
services is one of the major rationales for economic regulation in the sector.  Yet, the question 
arises how “natural” natural monopolies are.  The fact that economies of scale change over 
time, and that they may decline when the countries’ economies become more developed 
suggests that regulation has to adapt to the dynamic environment in which it is operating.   
In countries that typically have very high access rates, economies of scale tends to decrease 
and can turn into diseconomies of scale.  In such circumstances, marginal cost pricing may 
result in prices that are above the full (average) cost of service, giving utilities the possibility 
to earn excess profits.  The opposite tends to hold true when the sector is characterized by 
increasing returns to scale, when the marginal cost of service tends to be below the average 
cost of service, making it difficult for the utilities to achieve full cost recovery.  Yet, by 
pricing against average cost, consumers (including poor consumers) will have to pay tariffs 
that are higher than efficient prices.  In such circumstances, regulators have to protect the 
consumer, but also the utility’s financial viability.  The context of regulation in such an 
environment can further be affected by the degree of monopoly power in the water supply 
and/or sanitation market. In some countries with increasing returns to scale, water supply 
access rates may be relatively low (as was evident in the two lower-income countries in the 
sample: Vietnam and Moldova). In such cases, the utilities are not the only water supply 
providers and piped water tends to be a service with close substitutes. In such cases, 
contestability may exist in the water supply market for certain customer groups in certain 
localities over certain periods of time.  Nevertheless, the regulator still has the obligation to  
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protect consumers, even if at certain times certain utilities’ consumers may be able to exercise 
their consumer sovereignty.  Design of regulatory systems should take these features into 
account; as copying regulatory regimes and practices from developed countries to developing 
ones may not necessarily be very appropriate. 
 
The results of this study show that the cost structure of the water and wastewater sector varies 
significantly between countries and within countries, and over time.  Hence, a one-size-fit-all 
solution to regulating the sector is not going to be necessarily very successful as it is obvious 
that what type of regulation is needed and how effective it will be, depends on the 
organization of the sector itself, the environment in which the sector operates and the factor 
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Table 1. GNI Atlas and Inflation (GDP Deflator), source: World Bank. 
  Annual GNI per capita (Atlas 
method)
(a), in US dollars 
Inflation, GDP deflator 
  Brazil Colombia  Moldova  Vietnam  Brazil  Colombia Moldova Vietnam 
                
1996 4,320  -  480 -  100.00  -  100.00  - 
1997 4,720  -  500 340 108.22  -  112.55  100.00 
1998 4,610  -  470 350 113.51  -  118.86  108.84 
1999 3,900  -  410 360 119.96  -  172.20  115.08 
2000 3,670  -  390 380 129.98  -  219.27  119.00 
2001 3,110  -  400 -  139.65  -  245.78  - 
2002 2,680  -  470 -  153.85  -  269.93  - 
2003 2,760  1,810  590  -  176.91  100.00  310.06 - 
2004 3,090  1,810  710  -  -  107.06  334.72 - 
Note:  
(a) The Atlas conversion method is a smoothing algorithm devised by the World Bank to reduce the impact of 
exchange rate fluctuations. This applies a conversion factor that averages the exchange rate for a given year and 
the two preceding years, adjusted for differences in rates of inflation between the country, and through 2000, the 
G-5 countries (France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States). From 2001, these countries 




Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the four countries 
  Brazil Colombia  Moldova  Vietnam 
        
Number  of  utilities  26 228 39 67 
        
Period covered  1996-2004  2003-2004  1996-2004  1997-2000 
        
Average volume of water produced per 
utility (million cubic meters per year) 
395 22  4  13 
        
Average population served per utility 
(thousands) 
3,784 229  30  142 
        
Average length of the water distribution 
network (km) 
10,715 322  90  166 
        
Population coverage (population 
supplied/total population of the area) 
0.86 0.95 0.63  0.48 
        
Number of customers per kilometre of 
network 
376 664 275  788 
        
Average share of total volume sold to 
residential users per utility 
- 0.83  0.80  0.69 
        
Average duration of supply (hours per day)  -  -  14  18 
        
Number of pipe breaks per kilometre of 
network per year 
- -  4.40  4.33 
        
Share of contracted out services costs  0.14  0.10  0.03  - 
        
Share of energy costs  0.11  0.27  0.29  0.32 
        





Table 3. First-order coefficients of cost functions (standard errors in parentheses) 
   Brazil
(a) Colombia  Moldova  Vietnam 
          








Price of contracted out 





(0.004)  - 








Price of miscellaneous 








Length of the water 













produced   eff  0.009 
(0.047) 
-0.165** 
(0.080)  -  -0.099* 
(0.059) 
Share of metered 








Number of towns served  ntow  0.054 
(0.064)  - -  - 












Proportion of total volume 
sold to residential users   vres  -  -0.423* 
(0.249)  -  -0.071 
(0.099) 
Note: 
(a): *, **, *** indicate that the estimated elasticity is statistically significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 








Table 4. Own-price elasticities and Morishima elasticities of substitution computed at 
the sample mean (standard errors in parentheses) 
   Brazil
(a) Colombia Moldova  Vietnam 
    
    Own-price elasticities ( jj ε ) 





(0.037)  - 
























    
    Morishima elasticities of substitution ( jm σ ) 





(0.050)  - 





(0.072)  - 
Contracted out services vs. 
miscellaneous  





(0.038)  - 

























(a): *, **, *** indicate that the estimated elasticity is statistically significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 






Table 5. Measure of returns to density and returns to scale computed at the sample 
mean (standard errors in parentheses) 
   Brazil  Colombia  Moldova  Vietnam 
        
Returns to production 
density
(a) 








         
Returns to customer 
density 








         









(a): *, **, *** indicate that the estimated return is significantly different from 1 at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 









Table 6. Returns to density and returns to scale for different classes of WSS utilities in 











      
Total volume of water 
produced (million m
3/year)      


















      
Total number of connections 
served (in thousands)      


















      
Volume produced per 
residential customer (m
3/year)      


















      
Number of customers per 
kilometre of network      


















      
Note: 
(a): *, **, *** indicate that the estimated return is significantly different from 1 at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 





Table 7. Returns to density and returns to scale for different classes of WSS utilities in 











      
Total volume of water 
produced (million m
3/year)      


















      
Total number of connections 
served (in thousands)      


















      
Volume produced per 
residential customer (m
3/year)      


















      
Number of customers per 
kilometre of network      


















      
Note: 
(a): *, **, *** indicate that the estimated return is significantly different from 1 at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 





Table 8. Returns to density and returns to scale for different classes of WSS utilities in 











      
Total volume of water 
produced (million m
3/year)      


















      
Total number of connections 
served      


















      
Volume produced per 
residential customer (m
3/year)      


















      
Number of customers per 
kilometre of network      


















      
Note: 
(a): *, **, *** indicate that the estimated return is significantly different from 1 at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 





Table 9. Returns to density and returns to scale for different classes of Water utilities in 











      
Total volume of water 
produced (million m
3/year)      


















      
Total number of connections 
served       


















      
Volume produced per 
residential customer (m
3/year)      


















      
Number of customers per 
kilometre of network      


















      
Note: 
(a): *, **, *** indicate that the estimated return is significantly different from 1 at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 





Table 10. Estimated returns to scale at the sample mean of each year 
Year Brazil  Colombia  Moldova  Vietnam 
      
1996 0.989  -  1.216**  - 
1997 0.994  -  1.216**  1.221*** 
1998 0.977  -  1.254***  1.166*** 
1999 0.990  -  1.228***  1.129** 
2000 0.998  -  1.268***  1.131*** 
2001 0.987  -  1.273***  - 
2002 0.985  -  1.284***  - 
2003 1.001  1.125***  1.310***  - 
2004 0.992  1.100***  1.326***  - 
Note: 
(a): *, **, *** indicate that the estimated return is significantly different from 1 at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 











Brazil Colombia  Moldova  Vietnam 
          
Number of utilities    26  228  39  67 
Period covered    1996-2004  2003-2004  1996-2004  1997-2000 
          
Set of factor prices          
          
Contracted out services  c  X X  X  NA 
          
Energy  e  X X  X  X 
          
Labor  l  X X  X  X 
          
Miscellaneous  o  X X  X  X 
          
          
Set of control variables          
          
Length of the water network  len  X X  X  X 
          
Duration of supply  dur  NA NA  X  X 
          
Volume sold/volume produced  eff  X X  X  X 
          
Share of metered connections  mco  X X  X  X 
          
Number of towns served by the 
water utility  ntow  X X  X  X 
          
Number of pipe breaks  pbr  NA NA  X  X 
          
Population served  pop  X X  X  X 
          
Share of total volume sold to 
residential users  vres  NA X  X  X 
Note: 




Table A2. Translog cost function estimation results – Brazil (1996-2004) 
26 regional WSS companies, 213 observations 
Variable Coef.  Std  Err p-value  Variable Coef.  Std  Err  p-value
         
constant  0.416 0.0854 0.0000  we x len  -0.014 0.0044 0.0010
yws  0.829 0.0592 0.0000  we x pop  -0.013 0.0069 0.0530
we  0.114 0.0019 0.0000  we x mco  0.005 0.0049 0.3150
wc  0.150 0.0028 0.0000  we x ntow  0.003 0.0015 0.0590
wo  0.434 0.0035 0.0000  we x eff  -0.007 0.0077 0.3610
len  0.109 0.0466 0.0190  wc x len  -0.016 0.0073 0.0270
pop  0.108 0.0596 0.0690  wc x pop  0.004 0.0112 0.7250
mco  0.020 0.0345 0.5710  wc x mco  0.031 0.0081 0.0000
ntow  0.054 0.0641 0.4020  wc x ntow  0.000 0.0025 0.8490
eff  0.009 0.0471 0.8460  wc x eff  -0.016 0.0127 0.1990
yws x yws  0.228 0.1122 0.0420  wo x len  -0.009 0.0079 0.2500
we x we  0.075 0.0031 0.0000  wo x pop  -0.099 0.0109 0.0000
wc x wc  0.087 0.0034 0.0000  wo x mco  -0.010 0.0085 0.2250
wo x wo  0.180 0.0029 0.0000  wo x ntow  0.006 0.0029 0.0420
we x wc  -0.003 0.0019 0.0940  wo x eff  0.013 0.0147 0.3750
we x wo  -0.030 0.0013 0.0000  year 1997  -0.019 0.0088 0.0330
wc x wo  -0.037 0.0018 0.0000  year 1998  -0.064 0.0111 0.0000
len x len  -0.154 0.1043 0.1400  year 1999  -0.071 0.0113 0.0000
pop x pop   0.416 0.1577 0.0080  year 2000  -0.080 0.0122 0.0000
mco x mco  0.096 0.0803 0.2340  year 2001  -0.075 0.0127 0.0000
ntow x ntow  0.022 0.0496 0.6590  year 2002  -0.083 0.0136 0.0000
eff x eff  -0.065 0.1397 0.6410  year 2003  -0.058 0.0126 0.0000
len x pop  -0.135 0.0916 0.1390  year 2004  -0.079 0.0147 0.0000
len x mco  -0.016  0.0846 0.8460       
len x ntow  0.031  0.0438 0.4810       
len x eff  0.174  0.0853 0.0410       
pop x mco  0.040  0.0789 0.6140       
pop x ntow  0.013  0.0582 0.8240       
pop x eff  -0.133  0.1051 0.2060       
mco x ntow  0.014  0.0349 0.6900       
mco x eff  -0.064  0.0741 0.3880       
ntow x eff  -0.054  0.0536 0.3170       
yws x we  0.028  0.0066 0.0000       
yws x wc  0.013  0.0101 0.2020       
yws x wo  0.118  0.0096 0.0000       
yws x len  0.256  0.0814 0.0020       
yws x pop  -0.345  0.1275 0.0070       
yws x mco  -0.060  0.0579 0.3020       
yws x ntow  -0.054  0.0484 0.2620       
yws x eff  0.012  0.0951 0.9000        
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Table A3. Translog cost function estimation results – Colombia (2003-2004) 
48 WSS utilities, 78 observations 
Variable  Coef. Std  Err p-value  Variable  Coef. Std  Err p-value
         
constant  0.641 0.0245 0.0000  we x len  -0.005 0.0157 0.7720
yws  0.662 0.0564 0.0000  we x pop  -0.075 0.0228 0.0010
we  0.322 0.0067 0.0000  we x mco  -0.034 0.0105 0.0010
wc  0.142 0.0056 0.0000  we x vres  0.036 0.0364 0.3230
wo  0.344 0.0084 0.0000  we x eff  0.066 0.0256 0.0100
len  0.064 0.0597 0.2830  wc x len  -0.030 0.0121 0.0140
pop  0.224 0.0764 0.0030  wc x pop  -0.067 0.0170 0.0000
mco  0.091 0.0729 0.2140  wc x mco  -0.003 0.0078 0.7360
vres  -0.423 0.2494 0.0900  wc x vres  0.028 0.0267 0.2990
eff  -0.165 0.0801 0.0390  wc x eff  0.079 0.0189 0.0000
yws x yws  0.203 0.3091 0.5120  wo x len  0.015 0.0149 0.3220
we x we  0.161 0.0066 0.0000  wo x pop  -0.010 0.0232 0.6660
wc x wc  0.081 0.0042 0.0000  wo x mco  0.011 0.0113 0.3330
wo x wo  0.105 0.0050 0.0000  wo x vres  0.110 0.0398 0.0060
we x wc  -0.034 0.0037 0.0000  wo x eff  -0.093 0.0276 0.0010
we x wo  -0.046 0.0035 0.0000  year 2004  -0.004 0.0149 0.7630
wc x wo  -0.023 0.0034 0.0000       
len x len  -0.146 0.1335 0.2740       
pop x pop   -0.619 0.3949 0.1170       
mco x mco  0.017 0.0962 0.8560       
vres x vres  -0.466 0.6000 0.4370       
eff x eff  -0.558 0.4468 0.2120       
len x pop  0.472 0.1953 0.0160       
len x mco  0.227 0.2075 0.2740       
len x vres  0.509 0.4324 0.2390       
len x eff  -0.128 0.1776 0.4710       
pop x mco  0.444 0.4192 0.2900       
pop x vres  0.165 0.6296 0.7930       
pop x eff  0.569 0.3425 0.0970       
mco x vres  0.277 0.4642 0.5510       
mco x eff  -0.215 0.3005 0.4740       
vres x eff  0.206 0.3822 0.5900       
yws x we  0.098 0.0192 0.0000       
yws x wc  0.095 0.0139 0.0000       
yws x wo  0.011 0.0193 0.5550       
yws x len  -0.275 0.1479 0.0630       
yws x pop  0.095 0.2998 0.7510       
yws x mco  -0.594 0.2915 0.0420       
yws x vres  -0.635 0.4597 0.1670       
yws x eff  -0.414 0.3095 0.1810        
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Table A4. Translog cost function estimation results – Moldova (1996-2004) 
38 WSS utilities, 237 observations 
Variable Coef.  Std  Err p-value  Variable Coef.  Std  Err  p-value
         
constant  1.282 0.0614 0.0000  we x len  -0.022 0.0063 0.0000
yws  0.957 0.0320 0.0000  we x pop  0.007 0.0097 0.4770
we  0.376 0.0087 0.0000  we x pbr  -0.016 0.0036 0.0000
wc  0.058 0.0038 0.0000  we x dur  -0.003 0.0040 0.4300
wo  0.520 0.0082 0.0000  we x mco  -0.008 0.0026 0.0010
len  0.073 0.0919 0.4260  wc x len  0.003 0.0025 0.1970
pop  -0.041 0.0707 0.5610  wc x pop  -0.006 0.0038 0.1110
pbr  -0.014 0.0186 0.4570  wc x pbr  -0.003 0.0014 0.0260
dur  0.009 0.0273 0.7400  wc x dur  -0.005 0.0016 0.0010
mco  -0.002 0.0125 0.8510  wc x mco  -0.002 0.0010 0.1150
yws x yws  0.145 0.0240 0.0000  wo x len  -0.006 0.0067 0.3730
we x we  0.142 0.0047 0.0000  wo x pop  -0.083 0.0104 0.0000
wc x wc  0.028 0.0013 0.0000  wo x pbr  -0.008 0.0035 0.0180
wo x wo  0.173 0.0029 0.0000  wo x dur  -0.001 0.0042 0.7400
we x wc  -0.010 0.0016 0.0000  wo x mco  0.006 0.0027 0.0260
we x wo  -0.074 0.0025 0.0000  year 1997  0.004 0.0198 0.8420
wc x wo  -0.010 0.0012 0.0000  year 1998  -0.012 0.0196 0.5310
len x len  0.175 0.0588 0.0030  year 1999  0.005 0.0204 0.8090
pop x pop   0.171 0.0779 0.0280  year 2000  -0.013 0.0233 0.5800
pbr x pbr  0.002 0.0102 0.8680  year 2001  -0.018 0.0269 0.4950
dur x dur  -0.012 0.0132 0.3440  year 2002  -0.046 0.0285 0.1060
mco x mco  -0.014 0.0055 0.0120  year 2003  -0.076 0.0290 0.0080
len x pop  -0.099 0.0449 0.0270  year 2004  -0.084 0.0301 0.0050
len x pbr  0.013 0.0169 0.4570         
len x dur  0.065 0.0276 0.0190         
len x mco  0.002 0.0108 0.8510         
pop x pbr  0.006 0.0242 0.7980         
pop x dur  -0.043 0.0324 0.1870         
pop x mco  -0.006 0.0163 0.7280         
pbr x dur  -0.014 0.0086 0.1050         
pbr x mco  0.003 0.0050 0.5340         
dur x mco  0.003 0.0069 0.6370         
yws x we  0.055 0.0060 0.0000         
yws x wc  0.011 0.0026 0.0000         
yws x wo  0.106 0.0062 0.0000         
yws x len  -0.011 0.0222 0.6240         
yws x pop  -0.082 0.0371 0.0270         
yws x pbr  -0.019 0.0120 0.1120         
yws x dur  0.014 0.0153 0.3560         
yws x mco  -0.005 0.0092 0.6080          
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Table A5. Translog cost function estimation results – Vietnam (1997-2000) 
49 Water utilities, 145 observations 
Variable Coef.  Std  Err p-value  Variable  Coef. Std  Err  p-value 
          
constant  0.768 0.0570 0.0000  yws x we  0.020 0.0132 0.1310 
yws  0.613 0.0604 0.0000  yws x wo  0.032 0.0139 0.0220 
we  0.320 0.0061 0.0000  yws x len  -0.035 0.0443 0.4340 
wo  0.475 0.0074 0.0000  yws x pop  0.149 0.1280 0.2440 
len  0.058 0.0238 0.0140  yws x pbr  -0.008 0.0171 0.6430 
pop  0.340 0.0799 0.0000  yws x dur  -0.038 0.0789 0.6290 
pbr  -0.012 0.0086 0.1670  yws x mco  0.071 0.2076 0.7340 
dur  -0.179 0.0582 0.0020  yws x vres  0.157 0.0961 0.1020 
mco  0.004 0.1672 0.9790  yws x eff  0.013 0.1639 0.9340 
vres  -0.071 0.0989 0.4760  we x len  0.030 0.0099 0.0030 
eff  -0.099 0.0585 0.0910  we x pop  -0.019 0.0157 0.2280 
yws x yws  -0.151 0.1133 0.1830  we x pbr  -0.007 0.0026 0.0110 
we x we  0.134 0.0072 0.0000  we x dur  -0.006 0.0093 0.5310 
wo x wo  0.107 0.0028 0.0000  we x mco  -0.053 0.0315 0.0890 
we x wo  -0.059 0.0034 0.0000  we x vres  0.008 0.0203 0.6960 
len x len  0.056 0.0258 0.0310  we x eff  0.030 0.0258 0.2490 
pop x pop  -0.052 0.1381 0.7060  wo x len  -0.061 0.0093 0.0000 
pbr x pbr  0.002 0.0034 0.5510  wo x pop   0.041 0.0175 0.0190 
dur x dur  -0.079 0.0476 0.0950  wo x pbr  0.001 0.0030 0.6750 
mco x mco  0.112 0.3770 0.7660  wo x dur  0.052 0.0085 0.0000 
vres x vres  0.153 0.2587 0.5550  wo x mco  -0.183 0.0235 0.0000 
eff x eff  0.210 0.2646 0.4270  wo x vres  0.069 0.0218 0.0020 
len x pop  0.082 0.0583 0.1600  wo x eff  -0.066 0.0253 0.0090 
len x pbr  -0.024 0.0099 0.0160  year 1998  -0.003 0.0057 0.6570 
len x dur  0.021 0.0310 0.5000  year 1999  -0.005 0.0092 0.5620 
len x mco  -0.223 0.0937 0.0170  year 2000  -0.022 0.0142 0.1180 
len x vres  -0.340  0.1090 0.0020       
len x eff  -0.112  0.0744 0.1330       
pop x pbr  0.001  0.0174 0.9380       
pop x dur  -0.095  0.0788 0.2270       
pop x mco  -0.057  0.2262 0.8020       
pop x vres  0.046  0.0947 0.6250       
pop x eff  0.116  0.1767 0.5130       
pbr x dur  -0.018  0.0094 0.0540       
pbr x mco  0.032  0.0497 0.5230       
pbr x vres  -0.066  0.0307 0.0300       
pbr x eff  -0.115  0.0267 0.0000       
dur x mco  0.281  0.1152 0.0150       
dur x vres  0.441  0.1273 0.0010       
dur x eff  0.142  0.0945 0.1320       
mco x vres  -0.378  0.2646 0.1530       
mco x eff  -0.152  0.3162 0.6310       
vres x eff  0.165  0.2273 0.4680        
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Table A6. Comparison between municipal and regional WSS utilities in Brazil. 




    
Number of utilities  426  25 
Period covered  2000-2004  2000-2004 
Average volume of water produced per 
utility (million cubic meters per year) 
18 409 
Average population served per utility 
(thousands) 
174 4,041 
Average length of the water distribution 
network (km) 
541 11,506 
Population coverage (population 
supplied/total population of the area) 
0.84 0.85 
Number of customers per kilometre of 
network 
344 364 
Share of contracted out services costs  0.17  0.15 
Share of energy costs  0.24  0.11 
Share of labor costs  0.41  0.34 
    
Estimated returns to production density
(a,b) 1.36***  1.21** 
Estimated returns to customer density  1.14***  1.04 
Estimated returns to scale  1.00  1.09 
Note: 
(a): Returns to production density, returns to customer density, and returns to scale are computed at the 
sample mean. 
(b): *,**,*** indicates that the estimated return is significantly different from 1 at the 10, 5, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 